(1) Field of the Invention
The present invention is concerned generally with enhancing the ability of parties to engage in efficient bargaining. It has specific application and utility in situations where an aspect of the consideration (i.e., the thing of value) being sought by one of the parties is understood by at least one of the parties to be unavailable, or not readily available, from other sources (such as a buyout by one partner of another partner's interest in a partnership, a conveyance of closely held stock, or a contract for the provision of unique goods or services, etc.), with the result that the value that is ascribed to the consideration by one or both of the parties may be substantially influenced by their perception of the value placed on it by the other side, resulting in inefficiencies in the informational exchange and bargaining process that takes place between the parties. The invention provides a system or method whereby parties who find themselves in such situations may take unilateral steps to determine whether an outcome that they deem to be acceptable is acceptable to the other side, without first having to fully disclose that proposed outcome, or having to signify any willingness to consider compromise, to the other side. The invention does this by providing a unique system for the handling of escrow,1 with the result that the operational and functional aspects of the invention will be most readily appreciated and understood by parties who are experienced in the use or provision of escrow services, such as law firms and banking institutions. (For example, the Inventor is an attorney experienced in the use and provision of escrow services and of escrow-based instruments, such as letters of credit, maritime letters of undertaking and bonds posted in admiralty proceedings.) The principles that underlie the invention, and that give rise to its utility, will be most readily appreciated and understood by game theorists, i.e., by economists, mathematicians, and 2strategic analysts familiar with the study of “non-cooperative bargaining” as addressed in game theory and in studies of the so-called “strategy of conflict,” as discussed infra at note 3.
(2) Background Art